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The	basis	of	morality		Richard	Alexander	on		)ndirect	Reciprocity		Karl	Sigmund		ȋFaculty	of	Mathematics,	University	of	Vienna,	and	)nstitute	for	Applied	Systems	Analysis,	LaxenburgȌ		ȋan	introduction	to	an	excerpt	from	Alexander,	RD,	The	Biology	of	Moral	SystemsȌ		)n	Richard	Alexanderǯs	Biology	of	Moral	Systems	ȋBMS,		Alexander	ͳͻͺ͹Ȍ,	the	concept	of	indirect	reciprocity	plays	a	star	role.	The	author	firmly	states	ȋBMS	p.͹͹Ȍ	that	‚moral	systems	are	systems	of	indirect	reciprocityǯ,	and	writes	ȋBMS	p.ͻͷȌ	that	‚systems	of	indirect	reciprocity	become	automatically	what	)	am	here	calling	moral	systemsǯ.	One	chapter	of	the	book	is	entitled:	‚Moral	systems	as	systems	of	reciprocityǯ	ȋBMS	p.ͻ͵Ȍ,	etc.		)t	should	be	mentioned	in	this	context	that	Alexander	views	Ǯmoral	systemsǯ	as	guides	of	actions,	or	standards	of	conducts,	and	carefully	separates	them	from	the	concept	of	‚moralityǯ,	which	seems	much	harder	to	pin	down.		When	defining	indirect	reciprocity,	Alexander	contrasts	it	with	the	simpler	concept	of	direct	reciprocity.	The	latter	occurs	when	‚the	return	from	the	social	investment	in	another	individual	is	expected	from	the	actual	recipient	of	the	beneficence…	)n	indirect	reciprocity,	the	return	is	expected	from	someone	other	than	the	recipient	of	the	beneficence.	The	return	can	come	from	essentially	any	individual	or	collection	of	individuals	in	the	groupǯ	ȋBMS	p.ͺͷȌ.	The	concept	of	indirect	reciprocity	is	also	defined	in	
Darwinism	and	Human	Affairs	ȋͳͻ͹ͻȌ,	where	Alexander	writes:	ǮReciprocity	can	be	divided	into	two	types.	Direct	reciprocity	occurs	when	rewards	come	from	the	actual	recipient	of	beneficence.	)ndirect	reciprocity,	on	the	other	hand,	is	represented	by	rewards	from	society	at	large,	or	from	others	than	the	actual	recipient	of	beneficence.	We	engage	in	both	kinds	more	or	less	continuouslyǯ	ȋp.ͶͻȌ.		At	the	time	when	Alexander	wrote	these	lines,	in	the	late	Ǯseventies,	evolutionary	biology	was	just	beginning	to	acknowledge	the	importance	of	direct	reciprocity.	)n	particular,	Robert	Axelrod	and	William	D.	(amilton	were	using	computers	to	conduct	their	famous	round‐robin	tournaments	of	iterated	Prisonerǯs	Dilemma	games,	and	to	analyse	the	merits	of	Tit	For	Tat,	the	epitome	of	reciprocation	ȋAxelrod	and	(amilton	ͳͻͺͳ,	see	also	Axelrod	ͳͻͺͶ	and	(amilton	ͳͻͻ͸	Ȍ.	The	simplest	version	of	a	Prisonerǯs	Dilemma	
game	is	obtained	if	two	players	can	independently	decide	whether	or	not	to	confer	a	benefit	b	to	their	co‐player,	at	cost	c	to	themselves,	with	Ͳ<c<b.	The	dominating	strategy,	here,	is	to	defect,	as	this	maximizes	a	playerǯs	payoff,	no	matter	what	the	other	player	does.	But	if	the	game	is	repeated	sufficiently	often	between	the	same	two	players,	unconditional	defection	is	no	good	strategy	against	a	Tit	For	Tat	player,	i.e.,	a	player	who	confers	a	benefit	to	the	co‐player	in	the	first	round	and	from	then	on	does	whatever	the	co‐player	did	in	the	previous	round.	)n	particular,	Axelrod	and	(amilton	found	that	in	various	computer	simulations	of	repeated	Prisonerǯs	Dilemma	games,	selection	led	to	the	emergence	of	Tit	For	Tat,	and	hence	to	the	evolution	of	cooperation.	The	work	of	Axelrod	and	(amilton	thus	confirmed	Robert	Triverǯs	seminal	work	ȋTrivers	ͳͻ͹ͳȌ		which	had	established	reciprocity	as	the	second	pillar,	next	to	kin	selection,		to	support		altruism	in	evolutionary	biology.	)n	the	second	edition	of	Richard	Dawkinsǯ	The	Selfish	
Gene,	a	chapter	was	added	to	celebrate	the	triumph	of	Tit	For	Tat:	ǮNice	guys	finish	firstǯ		ȋDawkins	ͳͻͺͻȌ.			)ndirect	reciprocity	is	considerably	more	subtle	than	direct	reciprocity.	The	latter	is	based	on	the	principle	‚)ǯll	scratch	your	back	if	you	scratch	mineǯ,	whereas	the	former	is	based	on	‚)ǯll	scratch	your	back	if	you	scratch	someone	elseǯsǯ	ȋBinmore	ͳͻͻͶȌ.	The		merits	of	this	maxim	seem	less	immediate	to	grasp.	They	certainly	require	some	sophistication.	)n	Alexanderǯs	words,	Ǯindirect	reciprocity	involves	reputation	and	status,	and	results	in	everyone	in	a	social	group		continually	being	assessed	and	reassessed	by	interactants,	past	and	potential,	on	the	basis	of	their	interactions	with	othersǯ	ȋBMS	p.ͺͷȌ.	)n	another	statement,	Ǯindirect	reciprocity	develops	because	interactions	are	repeated,	or	flow	among	a	societyǯs	members,	and	because	information	about	subsequent	interactions	can	be	gleaned	from	observing	the	reciprocal	interactions	of	othersǯ	ȋBMS	p.͹͹Ȍ.	)t	is	this	assessment	of	the	actions	of	others	ȋeven	if	they	are	not	directed	at	oneselfȌ	which	is	the	basis	of	moral	judgements.			Every	idea	has	its	fore‐runners,	and	Alexander	points	out	repeatedly	that	others	before	him	have	dealt	with	generalizations	of	reciprocity,	which	he	views	as	Ǯthe	binding	cement	of	human	social	lifeǯ	ȋBMS	p.ͳͳͳȌ.		Alexander	was	particularly	influenced	by	Trivers	ȋͳͻ͹ͳ,	cf.	Trivers	ͳͻͺ͸	and	Trivers	ʹͲͲ͸Ȍ.	Darwin	had	also	anticipated	the	idea	that	assessments	by	others	play	a	fundamental	role	in	human	cooperation.	)n	the	Descent	of	Man,	Darwin	wrote	that	ȋin	contrast	to	other	social	animals	such	as	bees	or	antsȌ,	Ǯmanǯs	motive	to	give	aid	no	longer	consists	solely	of	a	blind	instinctive	impulse,	but	is	largely	influenced	by	the	praise	and	blame	of	his	fellow	men.ǯ	We	are	all	acutely	concerned	with	how	we	are	judged	by	those	around	us.	
	Alexander	thus	squarely	embraced	the	misanthropic	tradition	of	many	thinkers	before	him,	who	suspected	that	costly	and	seemingly	altruistic	acts	often	pay,	in	the	long	run,	and	therefore	are	not	altruistic,	even	if	actors	themselves	may	think	so.	Their	reward,	or	return,	can	come	from	various	sources,	either	individuals,	or	collections	of	individuals,	or	even	Ǯsociety	at	largeǯ.			Let	us	suppose	first	that	the	return	is	provided	by	individuals.	)n	direct	reciprocity,	A	helps	B	and	B	helps	A.	This	yields	a	net	benefit	for	both.	For	indirect	reciprocity,	Alexander	mentions	two	mechanisms,	by	way	of	example	ȋBMS	p.ͺͳȌ.	One	is	of	the	form:	A	helps	B,	B	helps	C,	C	helps	A.	Such	cycles	of	helping	were	analysed	by	Boyd	and	Richerson	ȋͳͻͺͻȌ,		who	found,	however,	that	they	were	fragile	and	unlikely	to	occur,	essentially	because	the	Ǯreturnǯ	is	so	roundabout	that	the	cycle	can	easily	be	broken.	The	other	mechanism	suggested	by	Alexander	was	the	following:	A	helps	B;	C,	observing,	later	helps	A;	A	helps	C.	This	means	that	A	was	rightly	judged	to	be	a	reliable	partner	by	C,	who	uses	this	information	to	engage	with	A	in	direct	reciprocity.	)n	this	sense,	indirect	reciprocity	acts	as	a	kind	of	foreplay	for	direct	reciprocity.	The	corresponding	strategy	for	the	repeated	Prisonerǯs	Dilemma	was	termed	Observer	Tit	For	Tat	ȋPollock	and	Dugatkin	ͳͻͻʹȌ:	it	only	deviates	from	Tit	For	Tat	in	the	first	round,	by	refusing	to	help	if	the	co‐player,	in	the	last	interaction	with	some	third	party,	has	refused	to	help.			But	actually,	the	system	proposed	by	Alexander	works	even	if	direct	reciprocity	is	explicitly	excluded.	This	was	shown	by	a	series	of	models	which	assumed	that	no	players	would	ever	meet	the	same	co‐player	again.	The	principle	is:	ǮA	helps	B;	C,	observing,	later	helps	Aǯ,	which	is	just	as	before,	except	that	the	appendix	ǮA	helps	Cǯ,	which	presumes	a	second	meeting	between	A	and	C,	is	omitted.	The	continuation	in	the	modified	version	is	implicit:	ǮD,	observing,	later	helps	Cǯ,	and	so	on.							)t	is	worth	to	explore	the	simplest	models	of	this	type	ȋNowak	and	Sigmund	ͳͻͻͺa,b,	Lotem	et	al,	ͳͻͻͻ,	Nowak	and	Sigmund,	ʹͲͲͷ,	Pacheco	et	al.	ʹͲͲ͸,	Sigmund	ʹͲͳͲȌ.	Thus,	suppose	that	in	a	large	population,	two	players	A	and	B	meet	randomly,	and	each		can	either	provide	some	help	to		the	other,	or	refuse	to	help.	ȋ)n	an	equivalent	version,	one	player	is	randomly	assigned	the	role	of	potential	donor	of	the	help,	and	the	other	the	role	of	recipient.Ȍ	)f	the	same	two	players	never	meet	again,	the	Tit	For	Tat	strategy	makes	no	sense.	But	a	closely	related	variant	of	discriminating	cooperation	does.	Players	using	this	Ǯreciprocatingǯ	strategy	refuse	to	help	those	players	who	
have	previously	refused	to	help	someone	else.	)n	this	way,	beneficence	is	channelled	towards	those	players	who	themselves	engage	in	beneficence.	)f	C	observes	that	A	helps	B,	then	C	will	help	A,	even	if	this	does	not	lead	to	repeated	interactions	between	A	and	C.	)n	a	sense,	this	is	a	vicarious	return:	C	returns	the	help	in	Bǯs	stead.			This	model	can	be	made	more	explicit	in	various	ways.	The	conditional	strategy	clearly	requires	that	players	have	some	information	about	the	past	behaviour	of	their	co‐players.	Such	information	can	be	incomplete,	and	still	lead	to	cooperation.	)t	is	enough,	for	instance,	to	require	that	ȋaȌ	with	a	certain	probability	q,	the	potential	donor	knows	whether	the	potential	recipient	has	refused	to	help,	on	some	previous	occasion,	and	ȋbȌ	in	the	absence	of	information,	the	donor	is	willing	to	use	the	Ǯbenefit	of	doubtǯ.	)f	the	probability	q	is	larger	than	the	cost‐to‐benefit	ratio	c/b,	cooperation	can	be	sustained	in	the	population:	exploiters	who	never	provide	help	will	rarely	receive	help,	and	do	less	well	than	the	discriminating	co‐operators.		Even	in	this	simple	toy‐model,	it	is	of	paramount		importance	that	players	can	acquire	sufficient	information	about	other	group	members.		Clearly,	such	Ǯsocial	scrutinizingǯ	ȋto	use	Alexanderǯs	termȌ	is	facilitated	if	individuals	have	a	good	memory,	and	spend	much	of	their	time	together.	But	it	is	likely	that	direct	observation	is	not	enough.	)n	all	human	groupings,	individuals	exchange	information,	and	communicate	what	they	observe	through	gossip.	(ere,	the	unique	language	abilities	of	our	species	come	into	play.	ȋǮFor	direct	reciprocity,	you	need	a	face;	for	indirect	reciprocity,	you	need	a	name.ǯ	(aigh,	personal	communicationȌ.		Conversely,	the	need	to	exchange	information	about	others	may	have	been	a	strong,	possibly	even	the	major	selective	force	behind	the	emergence	of	the	human	language	instinct	ȋDunbar	ͳͻͻ͸Ȍ.			Both	the	ability	to	learn	a	language	and	the	ability	to	learn	a	moral	code	seem	restricted	to	the	human	species.	Alexander	does	Ǯnot	exclude	the	possibility	that	indirect	reciprocity	[…]	will	eventually	be	documented	in	some	primates,	social	canines,	felines,	cetaceans	and	some	othersǯ	ȋBMS	p.ͺͷȌ.	Only	few	instances	of	indirect	reciprocation	have	been	documented	in	non‐human	species,	so	far	ȋBshary	and	Grutter	ʹͲͲ͸,	Rutte	and	Taborsky	ʹͲͲ͹Ȍ	On	the	other	hand,	a	large	number	of	economic	experiments	have	shown	that	humans	are	highly	prone	to	engage	in	indirect	reciprocity,	and	that	ȋaȌ	players	known	to		help	others	usually	increase	their	chances	in	getting	helped	by	third	parties	and	ȋbȌ	conversely	the	propensity	to	help	frequently	more	than	doubles	if	players	know	that	their	decision	will	be	communicated.	(elp,	in	this	context,	is	not	an	altruistic	act,	but	an		investment	into	the	social	capital	of	reputation	ȋWedekind	and	Milinski	
ʹͲͲͲ,	Wedekind	and	Braithwaite	ʹͲͲͳ,	Seinen	and	Schram	ʹͲͲͳ,	Milinski	et	al	ʹͲͲͳȌ.	This	confirms	Alexanderǯs	view	that	morality	based	on	indirect	reciprocity	may	be	seen	as	self‐serving,	because	it	causes	a	sufficient	number	of	persons	to	regard	the	actor	as	a	good	object	of	social	investment	ȋBMS	p.ͳͲͻȌ.		The	moral	assessment	of	other	group	members	can	be	captured,	in	its	simplest	form,	by	labelling	them	Ǯgoodǯ	or	Ǯbadǯ,	depending	on	whether	they	helped	or	not.	Clearly,	such	a	binary	assessment	leads	to	a	picture	in	black	and	white	which	is	much	cruder	than	what	we	are	used	to	in	real	life,	but	it	suffices	for	a	proof	of	principle.	Moreover,	it	raises	an	intriguing	issue.	)n	the	most	rudimentary	form	of	indirect	reciprocity,	the	discriminating	strategy,	a	cousin	of	Tit	For	Tat,	extends	help	to	those	who	are	Ǯgoodǯ	and	refuses	help	to	those	who	are	Ǯbadǯ.			(owever,	a	discriminating	player	who	refuses	to	help	a	Ǯbadǯ	player	becomes	Ǯbadǯ	in	the	eyes	of	all	observers,	and	therefore	less	likely	to	be	helped,	in	turn.	)n	order	to	maximize	the	help	one	receives	from	discriminators,	it	would	be	better	to	never	refuse	to	help,	and	thus	to	stop	discriminating.	But	in	a	group	without	discriminators,	exploiters	go	unpunished,	and	will	spread.	Cooperation	cannot	be	sustained	in	the	long	run.		A	remedy	coming	immediately	to	mind	is	to	assume	that	a	refusal	to	help	can	be	justified,	if	it	is	directed	towards	a	recipient	with	a	Ǯbadǯ	image	ȋNowak	and	Sigmund	ͳͻͻͺa,	Leimar	and	(ammerstein	ʹͲͲͳ,	Panchanathan	and	Boyd	ʹͲͲ͵Ȍ.	Such	a	justified	refusal	ought	therefore	not	to	be	labelled	as	Ǯbadǯ.	This	requires,	however,	that	observers	are	aware	of	the	reputation	of	the	potential	recipient.	This,	in	turn,	may	require	to	know	the	reputation	of	the	recipientǯs	previous	recipient,	etc.	)t	is	questionable	whether	under	normal	conditions,	individuals	have	enough	information	about	their	group	members,	or	are	sufficiently	proficient	at	coping	with	this	information	ȋMilinski	et	al	ʹͲͲͳȌ.	Moreover,	we	still	have	not	described	the		assessment	system	completely.	While	it	obviously	should	be	good	to	refuse	help	to	a	bad	player,	it	seems	less	clear	whether	giving	help	to	a	bad	player	should	be	considered	as	good	or	bad,	for	example.				This	leads	to	consider	assessment	systems	which	are	not	only	based	on	whether	help	is	given	or	not,	but	also	on	the	reputations	of	recipient	and	donor.	There	are	no	less	than	ʹͷ͸	of	them,	even	under	the	absurdly	oversimplified	assumption	that	a	player	can	only	be	Ǯgoodǯ	or	Ǯbadǯ,	without	intermediate	grades	ȋOhtsuki	and	)wasa	ʹͲͲͶ,		Brandt	and	Sigmund	ʹͲͲͶȌ.	)t	turns	out	that	only	ͺ	of	them	are	stable,	in	the	sense	that	a	population	which	adopts	them	will	cooperate	and	cannot	be	invaded	by	unconditional	strategies	of	always	giving	or	always	refusing	help	ȋOhtsuki	and	)wasa	
ʹͲͲ͸Ȍ.	The	competition	of		these	rudimentary		Ǯmoral	systemsǯ	under		conditions	which	include	the	possibility	of	occasional	errors	in	action	or	judgement	turns	out	to	be	remarkably	difficult	to	analyse	ȋOhtsuki	and	)wasa	ʹͲͲ͹,Uchida	and	Sigmund	ʹͲͳͲ,	Sigmund	ʹͲͳͲ,	Uchida	ʹͲͳͳȌ	.	)ndeed,	the	status	of	a	given	group‐member	will	in	general	be	different	for	observers	using	different	assessment	rules.	)f	additionally,	the	assessment	of	a	player	is	based	on	several	actions	of	that	player,	or	if	there	are	more	than	two	labels	for	a	playerǯs	reputation	ȋfor	instance,	Ǯgoodǯ,	Ǯbadǯ	and	ǮindifferentǯȌ,	the	complexity	of	the	moral	system	explodes.	Formalizing	ethics	appears	to	be	harder	than	formalizing	logic.	Practical	philosophy	defies	mathematizing.		)t	is	doubtful	whether	Alexander	would	view	the	investigation	of	formalized	systems	of	moral	assessment	rules	as	useful	or	relevant	for	evolutionary	biology.	)ndeed	models	of	indirect	reciprocity	which	isolate	it	from	direct	reciprocity,	on	the	one	hand,	and	from	group	interactions,	on	the	other,	are	artificial	devices,	useful	for	thought	experiments	but	far	removed	from	reality.		Alexander	is	more	interested	in	the	fluid,	and	ever	growing	boundaries	of	systems	of	reciprocity,	and	the	effect	of	this	development	on	the	human	psyche.	(e	suggests	that	Ǯindirect	reciprocity	led	to	the	evolution	of	ever	keener	abilities	to	observe	and	interpret	situations	with	moral	overtonesǯ	ȋBMS	p.ͳͲͲȌ.		Ǯ)	regard	indirect	reciprocity	as	a	consequence	of	direct	reciprocity	occurring	in	the	presence	of	interested	audiences	–	groups	of	individuals	who	continually	evaluate	the	members	of	their	society	as	possible	future	interactants	from	whom	they	would	like	to	gain	more	than	they	loseǯ	ȋBMS	p.ͻ͵Ȍ.	)n	particular,	Ǯwe	use	motivation	and	honesty	in	one	circumstance	to	predict	actions	in	others...(umans	tend	to	decide	that	a	person	is	either	moral	or	not,	as	opposed	to	being	moral	in	one	context	and	immoral	in	anotherǯ	ȋBMS	p.ͻͶȌ.	And	indeed,	it	is	remarkable	that	ancient	philosophers	saw	virtue	as	the	attribute	of	a	person,	whereas	contemporary	philosophers	speak	of	virtue	as	the	attribute	of	an	act,	or	a	decision.				There	seem	to	exist		mechanisms	of	indirect	reciprocity	which	are	not	based	on	reputation.	For	instance,	we	could	consider	a	situation	where	first,	A	helps	B,	and	then,	B	helps	a	third	party	C.	There	are	many	examples	of	this.	)f	someone	holds	the	door	open	to	us,	we	are	likely	to	hold	open	the	door	for	the	next.	This	type	of	indirect	reciprocity,	where	the	recipient	returns	the	help,	but	not	to	the	actual	donor,	has	also	been	observed	in	economic	experiments	and	seems	less	easy	to	explain	theoretically.			Moreover,	negative	interactions	may	also	be	reciprocated.	Alexander	usually	speaks	of	Ǯrewardsǯ	being	returned,	but	retaliation	clearly	is	also	a	wide‐spread	form	of	reciprocation,	and	he	mentions	it,	for	instance	on	a	
table	describing	various	forms	of	indirect	reciprocity	ȋBMS	p.ͺ͸Ȍ,		or	by	stating	that	Ǯsystems	of	indirect	reciprocity	involve	promises	of	punishment	as	well	as	rewardǯ	ȋBMS	p.ͻ͸Ȍ.	)n	the	last	two	decades,	experimental	economists	have	uncovered	a	wide‐spread	propensity	to	punish	those	who	are	perceived	as	cheaters.	So‐called	Ǯpeer‐punishmentǯ	is	very	effective	at	promoting	cooperation	ȋFehr	and	Gächter	ʹͲͲͲȌ.	)nterestingly,	many	individuals	are	ready	to	incur	personal	costs	to	punish	norm‐breakers,	even	if	they	themselves	were	not	affected	by	the	misdeameanour,	but	merely	observed	it.	This	is	certainly	also	a	form	of	indirect	reciprocity.					So	far,	we	have	considered	reciprocity	based	on	returns	by	individuals.	Alexander	stressed	on	several	occasions	that	such	a	return	could	also	be	provided	by	collections	of	individuals,	as	when	he	writes	Ǯindirect	reciprocity,	whereby	society	as	a	whole	or	a	large	part	of	it	provides	the	reward	for	the	beneficenceǯ	ȋBMS	p.ͳͲͷȌ.	Societies	provide	not	only	rewards	for	beneficence,	but	also	punishment	for	free‐riding.	)n	fact,	most	punishment	is	not	meted	out	by	irate	individuals	in	the	form	of	Ǯpeer‐punishmentǯ,	but	rather	by	institutions	ȋOstrom	ͳͻͻͲ;		Yamagishi	ͳͻͺ͸;	Sigmund	et	al.	ʹͲͳͲȌ.	)nstitutions	can	be	viewed	as	tools	enabling	communities	to	provide	positive	or	negative	incentives.	There	is	a	striking	similarity	between	institutionalized	punishment	of	free‐riding	and	the	repression	of	competition	encountered	in	many	examples	of	cooperative	groupings	encountered	in	biological	evolution	ȋFrank,	ͳͻͻͷȌ.		)n	a	particularly	interesting	aside	on	indirect	reciprocity,	Alexander	mentions	that		the	reward	which	an	individual	obtains	for	acts	of	beneficence	can	simply	consist	in	the	success	of	the	group	ȋBMS	p.ͻͶȌ.	This	relates	to	an	aspect	which	is	crucial	for	the	role	played	by	moral	systems,	in	Alexanderǯs	view.		)ndeed,	following	Keith	ȋͳͻͶ͹Ȍ,	who	stressed	the	competition	between	groups	as	a	main	factor	shaping	human	evolution,	Alexander	sees	Ǯmorality	as	a	within‐group	cooperativeness	in	the	context	of	between‐group	competitionǯ	ȋBMS	p.ͳͷ͵Ȍ.	According	to	his	celebrated		Ǯbalance	of	powerǯ‐argument,	the	often	lethal	competition	between	families,	bands,	tribes	and	nation	was	the	chief	selective	force	shaping	human	evolution.	Ǯ)n	no	other	species	do	social	groups	have	as	their	main	jeopardy	other	social	groups	of	the	same	speciesǯ	ȋBMS	p.͹͹Ȍ.		Alexander	accordingly	writes	ȋBMS	p.ͳͻͶȌ	that	Ǯindirect	reciprocity	is	more	complex	than	is	usually	realized	partly	because	of	long‐term	benefits	from	being	viewed	as	an	altruist,	and	partly	because	one	must	take	into	account	benefits	to	the	individual	that	accrue	from	the	success	of	his	group	in	
competition	with	other	groups.ǯ	This	latter	aspect	is	not,	in	general,	associated	with	Ǯindirect	reciprocityǯ	nowadays.	The	former	aspect	has	monopolized	the	meaning.	The	Ǯlong‐term	benefits	for	being	viewed	as	an	altruistǯ	help	to	establish	generalized	exchange	systems	working	to	mutual	advantage,	even	in	the	absence	of	strife	between	groups.			The	role	of	group	selection	has	been	hotly	contended	by	evolutionary	biologists	during	the	last	half‐century.	Mathematical	models	often	use	alternative	expressions,	such	as	kin	selection,	or	multi‐level	selection,	sometimes	with	the	intention	of	avoiding	semantic	quarrels,	and	usually	with	the	result	of	exacerbating	them.	But	there	seems	no	reason	to	avoid	the	name	Ǯgroup	selectionǯ	when	one	speaks	of	groups	fighting	and	annihilating	each	other.	)ndividuals		have	to	balance,	in	such	contests,	their	well‐being	within	the	group	with	the	well‐being	of	their	group.		This	viewpoint	was	shared	by	Darwin,	who	wrote:	'There	can	be	no	doubt	that	a	tribe	including	many	members	who	[...]	were	always	ready	to	give	aid	to	each	other	and	to	sacrifice	themselves	for	the	common	good,	would	be	victorious	over	most	other	tribes;	and	this	would	be	natural	selection.'	(e	did	not	say:	'...and	this	is		group	selection',	but	he	obviously	was	aware	of	the	tension	between	individual	and	group	selection	when	he	wrote:	'(e	who	was	ready	to	sacrifice	his	life	[...]	would	often	leave	no	offspring	to	inherit	his	noble	nature.	Therefore	it	seems	scarcely	possible	ȋbearing	in	mind	that	we	are	not	here	speaking	of	one	tribe	being	victorious	over	anotherȌ	that	the	number	of	men	gifted	with	such	virtues	could	be	increased	through	natural	selection.'	The	term	in	parentheses	clearly	indicates	that	Darwin	saw	no	way	of	explaining	the	evolution	of	such	self‐sacrificing	traits	other	than	by	violent	inter‐group	conflict.	)n	another	passage,	Darwin	stressed	that	'extinction	follows	chiefly	from	the	competition	of	tribe	with	tribe,	and	race	with	race.'		To	many	ears,	today,	this	sounds	politically	incorrect.	But	Darwin	was	very	conscious	of	this	dark	side	of	human	nature.	Some	of	the	most	remarkable	examples	of	human	cooperation	occur	in	war,	and	other	forms	of	lethal	conflict	between	groups,	and	it	is	well‐known	that	day‐to‐day	solidarity	dramatically	increases	in	societies	threatened	from	the	outside.						That	group	selection	can	favour	the	emergence	of	cooperative	traits	has	been	shown	in	countless	models.	)t	is	all	the	more	remarkable	that	the	models	and	experiments	on	indirect	reciprocity	which	have	been	mentioned	so	far	assume	a	single,	well‐mixed	population.	They	show	that	indirect	reciprocity	can	work	even	if	the	population	is	not	structured	into	competing	groups.	)ndividuals	who	deviate	from	the	cooperative	norm	will	
have,	on	average,	their	long‐term	payoff	reduced,	and	thus	are	unlikely	to	be	copied	by	others.	This	confirms	Alexanderǯs	view	that	it	is	fallacious	to	assume	that	morality	inevitably	involves	some	self‐sacrifice	ȋBMS	p.ͳ͸ͳȌ.	(owever,		it	confirms	it	in	a	set‐up	which	is	different	from	Alexanderǯs.				A	final	remark:	economists	have	also	been	investigating	extensions	of	the	concept	of	reciprocity,	in	parallel	to	evolutionary	biologists.	Their	point	of	departure	was	usually	the	so‐called	Ǯfolk	theorem	on	repeated	gamesǯ,	which	states	that		if	the	probability	of	another	round	between	the	same	two	players	is	sufficiently	high,	cooperation	can	be	sustained	by	so‐called	trigger	strategies,	of	which	Tit	For	Tat	is	but	one	example.	A	rational	player	would	forego	the	exploitation	of	a	co‐player	in	one	round	if	this	jeopardizes	collaboration	in	all	future	rounds.	)t	is	clear	that	if	players	interact	only	once,	a	cheater	cannot	be	held	to	account	by	its	victim,	and	therefore	personal	enforcement	must	be	replaced	by	community	enforcement.	Game	theorist	have	shown	that	even	if	information	is	transmitted	only	imperfectly,	cooperation	can	be	sustained,	based	on	trigger	strategies	adopted	by	the	whole	community.	No	rational	player	has	an	interest	in	deviating	unilaterally	ȋRosenthal	ͳͻ͹ͻ,	Sugden	ͳͻͺ͸,	Kandori	ͳͻͻʹ,	Ellison	ͳͻͻͶ,	Okuno‐Fujiwara	and	Postlewaite	ͳͻͻͷ,	Bolton	et	al	ʹͲͲͶaȌ.	The	interest	of	economists	in	indirect	reciprocity	has	been	singularly	heightened,	in	recent	years,	by	the	fact	that	one‐shot	interactions	between	anonymous	partners	become	increasingly	frequent	in	todayǯs	society.	Web‐based	auctions	and	other	forms	of	e‐commerce	occur	between	strangers	who	never	meet	face	to	face.	They	are	built	on	rudimentary	reputation	mechanisms	similar	to	those	which	were	developed	in	the	simplest	formal	models	capturing	Richard	Alexanderǯs	ideas	on	indirect	reciprocity	ȋBolton	et	al	ʹͲͲͶb,	Keser	ʹͲͲ͵Ȍ.							Richard	Alexander	recognized	indirect	reciprocity	based	on	reputation	and	status	as	major	factor	in	the	emergence	of	moral	systems	in	human	societies.	)t	is	amazing	that	the	same	simple,	robust	mechanisms	that	shaped	early	hominid	societies		now	play	a	central	role	in	shaping	the	internet	civilisation.											
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